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PROTECTING INFORMATION SECURITY UNDER
A UNIFORM DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW
Kathryn E. Picanso*
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, a major retailer announced that unauthorized access to its in-
store computer systems exposed thousands of customer credit card accounts
to potential misuse.I Unbeknownst to the retailer, the vendor who
implemented the credit card processing software had configured the
software to improperly retain unencrypted customer credit card information
in its log files. 2 The retailer was unaware of the problem until informed by
credit card issuing banks, which noticed fraudulent purchases totaling
several million dollars made using counterfeit copies of their customers'
credit and debit cards.3 These issuing banks had to cancel and reissue
thousands of cards and later sought to recoup their costs.4 Subsequent
litigation involved the retailer, software vendor, merchant bank, and credit
card issuing banks, leading to millions of dollars in potential liability for the
defendants and ensuring further publicity concerning the security breach.5
A regulatory investigation also ensued, followed by an enforcement action,
which was later settled.6
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Joel Reidenberg and JoAnn Kamuf their advice, guidance, and editing suggestions.
1. See Todd Weiss, Credit Card Data Breach Probed at BJ's Stores, ComputerWorld,
Mar. 19, 2004, http://www.computerworld.con/securitytopics/security/cybercrime/story/
0,10801,91412,00.html.
2. See David Bank, Store Blames Checkout Software for Security Breaches, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 27, 2005, at BI.
3. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n (FTC), BJ's Wholesale Club Settles FTC
Charges: Agency Says Lax Security Compromised Thousands of Credit and Debit Cards
(June 16, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/bjswholesale.htm.
4. See id.
5. See infra Part II; see also BJ's Wholesale Club, Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q), at 9
(Oct. 29, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1037461/
000119312505229785/dl0q.htm (noting that the amount of outstanding claims against the
corporation resulting from the breach-approximately thirteen million dollars-was
primarily from credit card issuing banks).
6. See Bank, supra note 2.
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Similar scenarios have played out in the news in recent years.7
Disclosures of security breaches, many spurred by state legislation, have
highlighted the need for better protection of information systems. In 2005
alone, CitiFinancial, Bank of America, Choicepoint, DSW, Ameritrade,
CardSystems, LexisNexis, Time Warner, and over forty colleges and
universities reported security breaches involving the loss or theft of
personal information. 8
The number of people potentially affected appears considerable.
Citigroup lost computer tapes containing sensitive data on 3.9 million
accounts as they were shipped via UPS from New Jersey to Texas.9 Bank
of America lost data on as many as 1.2 million credit card customers. 10 A
security breach by hackers at CardSystems Solutions, which processes
credit card transactions and other payments for banks and merchants, left
nearly forty million Visa and MasterCard accounts compromised."
Consumer data aggregator Choicepoint provided personal information on
approximately 145,000 individuals to criminals posing as legitimate
businesses. 12
Litigation and enforcement actions arising from these breaches are
growing as well. Lawsuits seeking class action status are proceeding in
California against CardSystems, MasterCard International, Visa USA, and
Choicepoint for the security breaches described above. 13 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), as well as states' attorneys general, has launched
investigations into a number of companies, including both Choicepoint and
CardSystems, for unfair practices. 14
This Note examines state and federal responses to information security
issues and suggests a proper framework for legislation in this area. Part I of
this Note discusses the problems posed by poor information security,
describes current federal and state efforts to force businesses to secure their
information networks and disclose any breaches resulting in potential
exposure of personal data, and comments on the relationship between state
7. See, e.g., Tom Zeller, Jr., Data Security Laws Seem Likely, So Consumers and
Businesses Vie to Shape Them, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2005, at C3.
8. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches Reported Since
the Choicepoint Incident, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last
visited Aug. 18, 2006).
9. See Tom Zeller, Jr., U.P.S. Loses a Shipment of Citigroup Client Data, N.Y. Times,
June 7, 2005, at C 1.
10. See Steven Marlin, Security Breach Exposes Data on Millions of Payment Cards,
Information Week, June 17, 2005, available at
http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=164900904.
11. See Eric Dash, Lost Data Improperly Kept, Company Admits, N.Y. Times, June 20,
2005, at A12.
12. See Timothy McTaggart & Demetrios Eleftheriou, What Every Business Should
Know About Data Security, Metro. Corp. Couns., Sept. 2005, at 21.
13. See id.; Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The New Law of Information Security: What
Companies Need to Do Now, Computer & Internet L. J., Nov. 2005, at 12.
14. See McTaggart & Eleftheriou, supra note 12; Shawna McAlearney, BJ's Settlement
with FTC Bodes Ill for Others, SearchSecurity.com, June 20, 2005,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sidl4__gci 1099579,00.html.
[Vol. 75
PROTECTING INFORMATION SECURITY
and federal laws. Part II considers potential judicial and statutory
approaches to protecting data security at the federal and state level. This
part examines state litigation and analyzes some of the issues confronting
plaintiffs who seek to recover damages under a negligence theory. Federal
proposals for a uniform data security and breach law are also considered,
along with their potential impact on current state models. Finally, Part III
concludes with a recommendation for a regulatory framework that
addresses the concerns for uniform data security regulations while
maintaining the consumer protections guaranteed under state legislation.
I. THE NEED FOR STRONGER INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS
Information is increasingly being gathered, used, and distributed in
electronic form. 15  Networked information systems that facilitate the
exchange of electronic information between computer devices have become
indispensable to businesses, governments, and individuals, but this reliance
has come with increased vulnerabilities.16 As networked computer systems
have grown in importance and use, the need for better information security
measures to protect these systems has also grown. Securing the data stored,
processed, transmitted, and received by networked information systems is
therefore critical. 17 Attacks targeting network vulnerabilities can come
from external sources-such as viruses, 18 worns, 19 and denial of service
attacks 2 0 -or from internal sources-such as careless or even disgruntled
employees. 21 When information systems house highly confidential data, or
15. See Kimberly Kiefer et al., Information Security: A Legal, Business, and Technical
Handbook, 2-3 (2004) (suggesting that electronic information has become a valuable asset
due to its importance in organizational activities and efficiencies).
16. See Kevin P. Cronin & Ronald N. Weikers, Data Security and Privacy Law:
Combating CyberThreats § 2:2 (Kevin P. Cronin ed., 2006) [hereinafter Data Security and
Privacy Law]; see also Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons: Overcoming
Fundamental Vulnerabilities to Critical Infrastructures in a Networked World, 58 Bus. Law.
349, 350-51 (2002) (summarizing private and public efforts to protect the nation's computer
infrastructure and proposing a four-point approach to encourage preparedness and full
disclosure of computer intrusions).
17. See, e.g., Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Information Security IT Examination
Handbook 1 (2006), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/
information..security/information.security.pdf (defining information security as "the process
by which an organization protects and secures its systems, media, and facilities that process
and maintain information vital to its operations"); Smedinghoff, supra note 13, at 11.
18. A virus is a computer program that replicates by gaining access to a computer and
inserting copies of itself into computer files. See Aaron Schwabach, Internet and the Law:
Technology, Society, and Compromises 303 (2006). Computers infected with viruses may
experience no harm, may slow down or crash, or may have their files corrupted or deleted.
See id.
19. Often confused with viruses, worms gain "backdoor" access to computers and
frequently install programs without users' knowledge. See id. at 318-20.
20. Infected computers can serve as "zombies" and launch denial-of-service attacks, in
which a large number of requests for access to a Web site, usually generated by "captured"
computers, renders the site unable to respond to requests by regular users. See id. at 83-84.
21. See D. Reed Freeman, Jr., Nat'l Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest, Information Security
for In-House Counsel: Reducing the Risk of Liability from Hacks, Attacks, and Other
2006]
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perform critical functions, the results of attacks and security breaches can
be disastrous.
Poor information security presents a number of problems. Most directly,
insecure networks are susceptible to security attacks. In a survey conducted
by the Computer Security Institute and the FBI's Computer Intrusion
Squad, nearly sixty percent of respondents detected computer security
breaches in 2005.22 The consequences of the attacks can vary from network
downtime or delays, to compromised or damaged records and files, to no
discernable impact at all.23
Network attacks can have serious ramifications on national security, as
both the military and the national economy are increasingly reliant on
critical infrastructures and information systems. 24 Critical infrastructures
are "those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum
operations of the economy and government, ' 25 many of which are privately
owned and operated. 26 Recognizing that the failure to protect information
networks could disrupt essential operations, and cause loss of revenue,
intellectual property, and even life, the federal government has called for
collaboration between industry, government, academia, and
nongovernmental groups to protect the nation's critical infrastructure, but
has stopped short of imposing specific security measures. 27
Identity theft, the fraudulent use of another person's personal
information, usually for economic gain, is another potential consequence of
inadequate security controls. 28 This type of fraud generally involves the
misuse of existing credit card, checking, savings, and phone accounts, or
the misuse of personal information for various uses, such as opening new
accounts and taking out new loans, renting an apartment, or receiving
Threats to Information, Briefly ... Perspectives on Legislation, Regulation, and Litigation,
Dec. 2002, at 6-8, available at http://www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/2002 12DECFreeman.pdf.
22. See 2005 Computer Security Institute and Federal Bureau of Investigation Computer
Crime and Security Survey 11 fig. 13, available at
http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/Bookstore/Documents/2005CSISurvey.pdf [hereinafter CSIIFBI
Survey].
23. Id.
24. See Nat'l Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), The National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace 1 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/.
25. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (May 22, 1998) [hereinafter Presidential Directive 63],
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/paper598.htm. Examples of critical
infrastructure systems include the telecommunications, energy, banking and finance,
transportation, and the water systems and emergency services. Id.
26. See NIAC, supra note 24, at 2.
27. See id. at 2, 6; see also David Bruggeman, Computer Security and Critical
Infrastructures: A Fine Line Between Secure and Vulnerable, in Chasing Moore's Law:
Information Technology Policy in the United States 119, 120-21 (William Aspray ed., 2004)
(noting the dire consequences of attacks on critical infrastructure and computer networks, yet
cautioning that encouraging secure networks should not undercut the robustness and
responsiveness of such networks).
28. See Data Security and Privacy Law, supra note 16, § 1:7.
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medical care. 29 A 2003 FTC survey revealed that nearly ten million
consumers discovered they were victims of some sort of identity theft in the
preceding twelve months.30 The consequences are costly in terms of time
and money: In 2003 alone, the cost of identity theft was estimated at forty-
eight billion dollars, and the average victim spent thirty hours correcting
records and clearing their reputation, often with no ability to recover
damages. 31
Beyond the direct cost of damages to businesses, poor information
security can lead to declining consumer confidence in electronic and
Internet transactions and lost customers. Recent surveys suggest that this
may already be happening,32 even though the problem of electronic identity
theft may be less pronounced than consumers realize. 33 While the cost
estimates of security breaches vary due to different methodologies for
calculating costs, overall damages to businesses can be substantial. 34 In
addition to the costs of remedying problems arising from security
breaches-such as replacing credit cards and providing free credit
monitoring-businesses can also suffer from dips in stock prices, damage to
reputation, and potential civil and even criminal liabilities.35
29. See id.
30. See FTC, Identity Theft Survey Report 4 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf.
31. See id. at 7.
32. See Dinesh C. Sharma, Data Leaks Denting Web Shoppers' Confidence, CNet
News.com, June 23, 2005, http://news.com.com/Data+leaks+denting+Web+shoppers
+confidence/2100-1029_3-5759294.html (citing two recent studies by the market researcher
Gartner, and the nonprofit research group, The Conference Board, which show, respectively,
that 75% of online shoppers are more cautious about where they buy goods online, and over
50% of internet users say their level of concern has grown); see also Ponemon Inst., National
Survey on Data Security Breach Notification (2005), http://www.whitecase.com/files/
FileControl/863d572d-cde3-4e33-903c-37eaba537060/7483b893-e478-44a4-8fed-f49aa917d
8cf/Presentation/lile/SecurityBreachSurvey%5bl%5d.pdf (reporting the results of a
survey sponsored by the law firm White & Case LLP and conducted by the Ponemon
Institute LLC, which found that after being notified of a breach, nearly 20% of respondents
said they ended a relationship with a company, 40% said they were thinking about ending
their relationship, and 5% said they hired a lawyer).
33. See Press Release, Better Bus. Bureau, New Research Shows that Identity Theft Is
More Prevalent Offline with Paper than Online (Jan. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.bbb.org/alerts/article.asp?ID=565 (finding that most identity theft among victims
who know the identity of the person committing the crime is still through offline means).
34. See Kevin J. Soo Hoo, How Much Is Enough?: A Risk-Management Approach to
Computer Security 41 (Consortium for Research on Info. Sec. & Policy, Working Paper,
2000), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/I 1900/soohoo.pdf (noting that in 1996 the
FBI estimated that total damage to U.S. businesses as a result of computer crime was around
three hundred billion dollars, a much higher estimate than other computer security surveys).
35. See Paul D. Shaw, Managing Legal and Security Risks in Computing and
Communications 2 (1998) (noting possible consequences of litigation arising from breaches,
such as costs, harm to reputation, and harm to customer and investor relations);
Smedinghoff, supra note 13, at 12; see also Gregg Keizer, Report: Security Slip-Ups Don't
Ding Stock Prices for Long, TechWeb News, Sept. 23, 2005,
http://www.techweb.com/wire/security/171200329 (discussing a research paper that noted
stock price decreases for companies, like Choicepoint and Cardsystems, whose core business
2006]
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A. The Role of Knowledge Sharing in Risk Assessment
Information sharing and disclosure improves security by helping to
identify vulnerabilities, establish best practices, raise better defenses, and
mitigate attacks. 36 One of the initial steps in most information security
programs is a risk assessment to identify and understand threats to the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and information
systems, followed by a determination of the appropriate levels of training,
controls, and testing necessary to mitigate those risks. 37 Throughout this
process, alternative strategies for dealing with risk are considered and
decisions are made as to the level of risk acceptable to an organization. 38
Understanding the acceptable level of risk allows management to make
well-informed decisions to justify information security expenditures. 39
More data on attacks, intrusions, and security breaches is essential to
improving overall information infrastructure protection.40 Models used to
assess risk require information on the actual numbers of events, the costs of
those events, and the cost of implementing security controls, 41 but the total
number of security breaches and breach attempts is uncertain.42
Undoubtedly a large number of breaches and attempts go undetected,43 and
was affected by security breaches, but only temporary harm to the stock prices of other
businesses).
36. See Comm. on Critical Info. Infrastructure Prot. and the Law, Nat'l Res. Council,
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and the Law: An Overview of Key Issues 17
(Stewart D. Personick & Cynthia A. Patterson eds., 2003) [hereinafter Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection] (analyzing the legal issues involved in information security).
Examples of industry suggestions to most effectively improve security issues include the
sharing of information about potential threats and best practices for protecting against such
threats, and establishing a single point of contact for administrators of backbone ISPs to
share real-time information about attacks. Id.
37. See Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, supra note 17, at 5-6.
38. See Soo Hoo, supra note 34, at 3, 12 (arguing that the information security insurance
needs, liability exposure, and market competition will help shape a new quantitative
framework for managing risk).
39. See Gary Stonebumer, Alice Goguen, & Alexis Feringa, Risk Management Guide
for Information Technology Systems: Recommendations of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology 2 (2002), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp8OO-30.pdf (providing guidelines for
federal organizations which process sensitive information).
40. See Frye, supra note 16, at 370 (arguing for governmentally mandated full reporting
of cyberintrusions and measurable damages to overcome market incentives preventing
disclosure of information); see also Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, supra note
36, at 17.
41. See Soo Hoo, supra note 34, at 4, 29 (discussing the Annual Loss Expectancy Model
("ALE"), a common metric used in risk-management modeling first proposed by the
National Bureau of Standards in 1979).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 30 (citing a Defense Information Systems Agency 1996 report estimating
that 96% of successful break-ins were undetected, and only 27% of detected break-ins were
reported).
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of the ones that are detected, only a subset get reported because businesses
are wary of revealing security breaches and breach attempts.44
This hesitation on the part of businesses to report security intrusions
stems from a number of factors, including fears of increased liability, anti-
trust litigation, loss of proprietary information, and harm from negative
publicity.45 Recognizing the need for such collaboration and disclosure, the
federal government has sought to allay these fears and encourage
information sharing in the private sector.46 Presidential directive PD-63,
issued by President Clinton in 1998, called for the creation of industry-
specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers ("ISACs") to encourage
industries to gather, analyze, and disseminate information when
appropriate. 47 ISACs have been created in several industries, including the
financial services, information technology, electric power,
telecommunications, chemical and rail industries.48 Government attempts
to promote information sharing and business collaboration have had mixed
success, however, and currently most information sharing occurs through
informal channels. 49 Much of the legislation in the area of information
security, as described in Part II, seeks to deal with these problems of
nondisclosure.
Despite the potential risks associated with lax security procedures, not all
businesses take necessary precautions against security lapses. 50 In the
absence of adequate self-regulation, federal and state governments have
stepped in and required businesses to protect their information assets. The
44. See Critical Information Structure Protection, supra note 36, at 18-19; see also
CSI/FBI Survey, supra note 22, at 18-19 (reporting that while 63% of respondents reported
sharing information regarding computer intrusions, only 20% reported intrusions to law
enforcement).
45. See Frye, supra note 16, at 374-76; see also Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection, supra note 36, at 24-33. Antitrust law seeks to discourage collusion among
companies and increase competition in the marketplace. For this reason, companies fear that
information sharing may be viewed as collusive and therefore anticompetitive. See Critical
Information Infrastructure Protection, supra note 36, at 30.
46. See supra notes 24, 39.
47. See Presidential Directive 63, supra note 25.
48. See Dep't of Homeland Sec., Threats and Protection: Information Sharing &
Analysis Centers, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=73&content- 1375 (last
visited Aug. 20, 2006).
49. See Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, supra note 36, at 18 (noting that
most ISACs are still in their infancy or planning stages); CSIIFBI Survey, supra note 22, at
20 tbl.23. Survey results show that 46% of respondent organizations do not belong to any
information sharing organization, although that percentage may be lower among
organizations in general. The authors of this study acknowledge that the respondents may be
more "security savvy" than general information technology professionals because they are
all members or conference attendees of the Computer Security Institute and have shown a
heightened interest in information security. CSIIFBI Survey, supra note 22, at 5.
50. See Scott Berinato, Six Secrets of Highly Secure Organizations, CIO Magazine,
Sept. 15, 2004, at 51, available at http://www.cio.com/archive/091504/security.html
(reporting that of the thirty security priorities named in the 2003 survey, many respondents
fell short on implementing twenty-eight of those measures).
2006]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
following section discusses some of the obligations arising from federal and
state legislation.
B. Current Information Security Obligations
Corporate computer security is governed by a patchwork of state and
federal statutes and regulations. While a number of those statutes impose
criminal penalties for individuals who intentionally hack into network
systems, 51 this Note discusses laws imposing obligations on corporations to
secure data and computer networks against attacks, intrusions, or system
failures, and to disclose information to affected individuals regarding
security breaches.
1. Obligations to Protect Information Systems and Data
At the federal level, governmental agencies responsible for promulgating
regulations have taken a process-oriented approach to information
security.52  Rather than mandate specific technical measures, these
regulations require the implementation of a comprehensive security
program suitable to an organization's needs. 53 Organizations covered by
these regulations must assess the vulnerabilities of their information
technology systems, estimate the likelihood that injurious scenarios may
occur, and take appropriate steps to mitigate those risks.54 This approach
was first seen in the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of
1998, 55 but most of the development in this area has resulted from the
enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 56  and the
implementation of the FTC's Safeguards Rule. 57
51. See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000) (making
unauthorized access and damage to "protected computers"--defined broadly enough so as to
essentially include any computer connected to the Intemet-a crime); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710 (2000) (prohibiting
unlawful access to, and certain disclosures of, electronic communications, and requiring law
enforcement officials to follow procedures for accessing electronic communications held by
third parties); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 271 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (amending several
preexisting laws to provide the government with additional tools for combating terrorism);
see also Keifer, supra note 15, at 17-30 (describing various cybercrime laws).
52. See Smedinghoff, supra note 13, at 13.
53. See, e.g., Federal Information Security Management Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3544 (Supp.
2002); Federal Trade Commission Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16
C.F.R. § 314 (2006).
54. See Smedinghoff, supra note 13, at 13.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 6501-06 (2001). The implementing regulations require Web site
operators who collect personal information to "establish and maintain reasonable procedures
to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal information collected from
children." 16 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2004).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2000).
57. 16 C.F.R § 314.4.
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a. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the FTC's Safeguard Rule
The GLBA, also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999, laid out this process-oriented approach in security regulations for the
financial industry. 58 The purpose of the GLBA was to "modernize" the
financial services industry by repealing regulations that prevented the
merger of banking, insurance, and securities companies. 59 To assuage fears
that newly merged companies would have unrestricted access to an
incredible amount of personal information, the Act set notification
requirements on the use of personal information,60 mandating that a
financial institution provide privacy notices to customers detailing what
type of nonpublic personal information the institution collects, with whom
the institution shares the information, and how it protects the information. 61
Under the GLBA's privacy obligation policy, "each financial institution
has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its
customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those
customers' nonpublic personal information."62 The Act requires financial
corporations to (1) establish appropriate standards for administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards that will ensure the security and
confidentiality of customer information, (2) protect the security of these
records against any anticipated threats, and (3) protect against unauthorized
access or use of this information, which could result in substantial harm or
inconvenience to customers. 63
Various federal agencies, including the FTC, are responsible for
promulgating the information security procedures for the different sectors
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809; Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information
Security Standards, 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. D-2.III (2006) (Federal Reserve Board); 12
C.F.R. pt. 30 app. B (2006) (Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury); 12 C.F.R. pt. 364 app.
B (2006) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); and 12 C.F.R. pt. 570 app. B (2006)
(Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury).
59. See U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, Financial Services
Modernization Act: Gramm-Leach-Bliley Summary of Provisions,
http://banking.senate.gov/conf/grmleach.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2006).
60. See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Emily Honig, Victoria's Secret and Financial
Privacy, http://www.epic.org/privacy/glba/victoriassecret.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2006)
(reporting on the role that a Victoria's Secret catalog may have played in generating
Congressional Republican support for the privacy provisions of the GLBA).
61. See FTC, In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, http://www.ftc.govibcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/glbshort.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2006).
The privacy notice should also provide information on how consumers and customers can
choose to opt out of sharing arrangements between the financial institution and its affiliates,
a right provided under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Id.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a). Financial Institutions are defined as any businesses engaged in
financial activities as described in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2000). 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3).
Examples include banks, brokers, dealers, insurance companies, credit unions, non-
depository lenders, consumer reporting agencies, debt collectors, data processors, courier
services, retailers that issue credit cards, personal property or real estate appraisers, check-
cashing businesses, and mortgage brokers. See 16 C.F.R. § 314.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b).
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of the financial industry (known as the "Interagency Guidelines"). 64 These
agencies are also charged with enforcing the regulations over the respective
financial institutions subject to their jurisdiction.65  The FTC's set of
standards for the protection of customer records and information, known as
the Safeguards Rule, has had the greatest impact through the FTC's
enforcement actions against financial and nonfinancial organizations. 66 The
FTC's rule covers any financial institution that handles customer
information, including not only institutions that collect nonpublic personal
information from their own customers, but also those financial institutions
that receive customer information from other financial institutions. 67
The Safeguards Rule requires financial institutions to "develop,
implement, and maintain a comprehensive information security program
that... contains administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that are
appropriate to [the institution's] size and complexity, the nature and scope
of... activities, and the sensitivity of any customer information at issue."68
The required administrative safeguards under the Rule include the
following: designating someone to coordinate the information security
program; performing a risk assessment that considers personnel training,
information systems, and the detection, prevention, and response to attacks,
intrusions, and other systems failures; designing and implementing
safeguards to control risks and regularly testing safeguards to monitor
effectiveness; overseeing service providers by ensuring that they are able to
take appropriate security precautions and in fact do so; and updating the
security program as necessary in response to frequent monitoring and
material changes in the business.69
A security breach need not occur for the FTC to take action: "[A]n actual
breach of security is not a prerequisite for enforcement under Section 5 [of
the Federal Trade Commission Act]; however, evidence of such a breach
may indicate that the company's existing policies and procedures were not
adequate. ' 70  The commission acknowledges, however, that "perfect
security" is not attainable, and breaches can occur even where every
reasonable precaution has been taken.71
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 6805(b). For examples of these standards, see supra note 52.
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a).
66. See 16 C.F.R. § 314. The FTC's authority extends to "non-traditional" financial
institutions or persons not covered under the other GLBA regulatory agencies, whose
respective jurisdictions cover banks, credit unions, securities firms, and insurance
companies. 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a); see also FTC, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/glbact.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2006).
67. See 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(b).
68. Id. § 314.3(a).
69. See id. § 314.4.
70. Data Breaches and Identity Theft: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Sci., and Transp., 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman,
FTC), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/flc.pdf [hereinafter Identity Theft
Hearing].
71. See id.
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Armed with the Safeguards Rule, the FTC has embarked on an
aggressive strategy of investigations, enforcement actions, and settlements
with companies that have agreed to implement the regulations and obtain
independent security audits for a set period of time. Enforcement actions
originally targeted mortgage companies for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Rule, 72 and also nonfinancial institutions whose privacy
statements were found to have false and misleading information in light of
subsequent security breaches. For example, Petco Animal Supplies, Inc.,
settled FTC charges that a security flaw in its Web site allowed hackers to
access consumer records, including credit card numbers, in violation of
privacy promises made to customers.73 The FTC alleged that Petco could
have taken simple steps to prevent the type of attack that occurred and that
credit card information would not have been accessed by intruders had the
data actually been encrypted, as Petco claimed on its Web site.74 The FTC
charged that these claims were deceptive and violated the Federal Trade
Commission Act.75 "Consumers have the right to expect companies to keep
their promises about the security of the confidential consumer information
they collect," said the Acting Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer
Protection.76 "The FTC will hold companies to their word."'77
Recently, however, the FTC has expanded the reach of the Safeguards
Rule beyond financial institutions and businesses with false and misleading
privacy statements, to those nonfinancial institutions that experience
security breaches due to lax information security policies and procedures. 78
The FTC derives its authority over the information security practices of
nonfinancial institutions from Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which prohibits unfair and deceptive trade practices. 79
72. See In re Sunbelt Lending Services, Inc., No. C-4129, 2005 WL 120875 (FTC Jan.
3, 2005) (alleging that company failed to perform a risk assessment, implement reasonable
policies and procedures, train employees, oversee the collection of customer information
through its web site, and ensure that service providers were providing appropriate security);
In re Nationwide Mortgage Group, Inc., No. 9319, 2004 WL 3142856 (FTC Nov. 9, 2004)
(similar allegations). Both companies settled charges with the FTC and agreed to implement
security procedures and submitted to biennial security audits by a third party professional for
ten years. See In re Nationwide Mortgage Group, Inc., No. 9319, 2005 WL 996696 (FTC
Apr. 12, 2005); In re Sunbelt Lending Services, Inc., 2005 WL 120875.
73. See Press Release, FTC, Petco Settles FTC Charges: Security Flaws Allowed
Hackers to Access Consumers' Credit Card Information (Nov. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/ 1/petco.htm.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. (citing statements made by Lydia Parnes, Acting Director of the FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., In re DSW, Inc., No. 052-3096, 2005 WL 3366974 (FTC Dec. 1, 2005)
(alleging that the failure to provide adequate security measures, which compromised over
one million debit and credit cards, constituted an unfair act or practice); In re BJ's Wholesale
Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 WL 2395788 (FTC Sept. 20, 2005) (alleging that maintaining a
record of account information in violation of industry standards and failure to adopt adequate
security measures was an unfair practice).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
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Under this general enforcement authority, the FTC can investigate and
pursue actions against businesses whose activities qualify as practices that
"cause or are likely to cause consumers substantial injury that is neither
reasonably avoidable by consumers nor offset by countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition." 80
b. FTC Expansion of the Safeguards Rule
The first action expanding the scope of the FTC's authority beyond
deceptive practices involved BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., in a scenario
similar to the one described in the introduction. 81 In March of 2004, BJ's
announced that unauthorized access to its computer systems from at least
November 2003 to February 2004, resulted in the possible theft of personal
information, including names and credit card numbers, from thousands of
customers. 82 BJ's did not notice the breach until informed that several
million dollars of fraudulent purchases had been made with counterfeit
copies of credit and debit cards by banks that had issued the credit cards to
customers. 83 In this enforcement action, the FTC pursued the broader
strategy of alleging that the failure to ensure adequate security measures
constituted an unfair practice. 84 The Commission did not claim that BJ's
made misrepresentations to their customers, as in the Petco action. Rather,
it charged that BJ's failure to provide adequate security measures
constituted an unfair practice that violated federal law.85 The agency
contended that BJ's failed to encrypt personal data while in transit or when
stored on the computer networks of their stores; created unnecessary risks
by storing information longer than necessary in violation of bank rules;
stored personal data in easily accessible files; failed to take adequate steps
to prevent unauthorized wireless connections; and failed to take reasonable
measures to detect unauthorized network access or conduct security
audits. 86
In a signed consent decree that did not acknowledge any wrongdoing,
BJ's agreed to a settlement requiring the implementation of a
comprehensive security program. 87 The retailer promised to designate
someone responsible for the information security program, perform a risk
assessment, take "reasonable safeguards" to mitigate risks, test and monitor
safeguards, and adjust the program in response to material changes-
80. Identity Theft Hearing, supra note 70, 5-6 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)).
81. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
82. See In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 WL 2395788.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
86. See id.
87. See id.
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essentially the requirements of the FTC's Safeguards rule.88 BJ's also
agreed to perform biennial security audits for the next twenty years. 89
c. State Consumer Fraud Statutes
State attorneys general have also pursued enforcement actions against
companies engaging in improper data security practices under consumer
fraud statutes.90 In general, these statutes prohibit all deceptive practices
and misrepresentations, whether intentional or not, and are used to
encourage better compliance with accepted security standards. 91 Many
states allow both attorneys general and injured private parties to bring suit,
and at least two allow class action suits.92
The enforcement actions pursued under these statutes are similar to the
FTC's actions, as one example, involving the magazine publisher Ziff-
Davis, shows. The company reached a settlement agreement with the
attorneys general of Vermont, New York, and California, in which it agreed
to implement better security procedures after it had inadvertently placed the
personal information, including credit card numbers, of some of its
subscribers on its Web site.93 Statements made by the company that it used
"reasonable precautions" to keep consumer information secure, when it had
not implemented adequate security measures, were considered false
statements under the states' respective consumer fraud statutes. 94
The terms of the settlement required Ziff Davis to identify data security
vulnerabilities; implement a risk assessment plan which included employee
training, response procedures, and monitoring of information systems;
encrypt data; control access to consumer data; and assess applications for
security risks before any implementation. 95 The company also agreed to
88. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., In re Eli Lilly, Inc., Assurance of Voluntary Compliance and
Discontinuance, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/medicailillyagreement.pdf. Eli
Lilly sent an e-mail to subscribers of their Prozac.com site, and accidentally disclosed all
other subscribers' e-mails in the "To" field. Id. 1.2-1.4, 2.4-2.5. In addition to
implementing reasonable security procedures, the company paid $160,000 to the eight states
pursuing the action. Id. 5.4, 5.8.
91. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500 (West 2005); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law
§§ 349-350 (McKinney 2004); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2451 (2005).
92. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 426.110 (West 2005); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-108 (2005).
93. See In re Ziff Davis Media Inc., Assurance of Discontinuance, at 2 (Aug. 28, 2002),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug28a_02-attach.pdf.
94. See id. at 3-4. The respective statutes violated were Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§
17200, 17500 (prohibiting unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices and untrue or
misleading advertising); N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(12) (McKinney 2002) (prohibiting repeated,
fraudulent, and/or illegal business activities); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349-350 (allowing the
New York Attorney General or any injured person to bring suit against anyone committing
"[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce"); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 9, § 2451 (prohibiting deceptive business practices and false advertising). In re Ziff
Davis Media, supra note 93, at 4.
95. See In re Ziff Davis Media Inc., Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 93, at 5-6.
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pay $100,000 divided among the three states, and $500 to each consumer
who submitted credit card information. 96
While enforcement actions by the FTC and states' attorneys general may
motivate businesses to better protect data against security breaches and raise
awareness of security issues, most of the recent attention regarding data
security has come from the large numbers of security breach disclosures
reported under state notification laws.97
2. The Obligation to Disclose Information
Recognizing the injurious effect that security breaches can have on
individuals and corporations, both the federal government and state
legislatures have passed measures requiring the disclosure of information
related to security breaches, and more legislation may be forthcoming.98
a. State Regulations
The most prominent breach notification legislation is California's
Database Breach Notification Security Act ("SB 1386"), enacted in 2002.99
The statute requires any organization doing business in California to
disclose to "resident[s] of California whose unencrypted personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person."'100 The purpose of SB 1386 is to help consumers
protect themselves against identity theft, or minimize the damage if a crime
has already occurred, by informing consumers expeditiously of possible
misuse of their personal information.' 0 ' To that end, SB 1386 provides a
private right of action for any person harmed by a failure of a business or
organization to give notice.102
Since the law was enacted, over ninety organizations have reported
security breaches that have resulted in the exposure, theft, or loss of almost
96. See id. at 7-8.
97. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 8.
98. See infra Part II.A.
99. See, e.g., Identity Theft Hearing, supra note 70, at 8-9 (statement of William H.
Sorrell, Attorney General of the State of Vermont and President of the National Association
of Attorneys General) (commenting on the role of Database Breach Notification Security Act
("SB 1386") in raising awareness about inadequate information security).
100. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(a) (West Supp. 2005). Personal information includes
name in combination with social security number, driver's license number, state
identification card number, and any account number that would allow access to an
individual's financial account. Id.
101. See id. (historical and statutory notes). Notice is to be given in the "most expedient
time possible and without unreasonable delay," unless a law enforcement agency believes
that notification will interfere with a criminal investigation. Id. § 1798.82(a), (c).
102. See id. § 1798.84. Some commentators fear that this right will lead to class action
lawsuits and large civil suit judgments. See, e.g., Timothy H. Skinner, California 's Database
Breach Notification Security Act: The First State Breach Notification Law Is Not Yet a
Suitable Template for National Identity Theft Legislation, 10 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 55
(2003).
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ninety million records.103 Widespread publicity over these disclosures has
led to the enactment of similar laws in over twenty states, 10 4 and the
introduction of a number of Congressional House and Senate bills with
similar security breach disclosure requirements. 10 5 While hailed by privacy
and consumer advocates as a much-needed tool against lax security
practices, a number of issues still remain, such as when notice must be
provided. 106
b. Federal Regulations
Existing federal regulations impose reporting requirements on certain
businesses. Under the GLBA regulations, financial institutions should
implement a "risk-based response program to address incidents of
unauthorized access to customer information in customer information
systems."' 1 7 At a minimum, institutions should determine the scope of the
breach, take steps to control further unauthorized access or use of customer
information, notify the appropriate federal regulating agency and law
enforcement authorities, and inform customers if the institution believes
that their information has been, or could reasonably be, misused.108
A company may find itself subject to both GLBA's and state statutory
requirements in the event of a breach. Only to the extent that such statute is
inconsistent with the specified provisions of the Act will the GLBA
supersede state statutes or regulations. 109 The GLBA does not preempt
more protective state laws and includes a savings clause, which provides
that "a State statute, regulation, order, or interpretation is not
inconsistent ... if the protection such statute, regulation, order, or
interpretation affords any person is greater than the protection provided...
as determined by the [FTC]." 110 Given the overlapping nature of much
federal legislation, however, this clause has not prevented preemption of
103. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 8.
104. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, 2005 Breach of Information Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breach05.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
105. These include bills before the Senate Commerce Committee, S. 1408, 109th Cong.
(2005), the Senate Judiciary Committee, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005), and the House Energy
and Commerce Committee, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2005). See Ctr. for Democracy &
Tech., Congress Considers Data Security Legislation (2005),
http://www.cdt.org/publications/policyposts/2005/21 (commenting on the current data
security legislation being considered by Congress).
106. See Skinner, supra note 102, at 21-26 (noting that the complexity of online
transactions makes the scope of the notice provision difficult to determine).
107. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. D-2, supp. A, 11 (2006) (Federal
Reserve Board).
108. See id. ILA, III.A.
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 6807(a) (2000).
110. Id. § 6807(b).
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state privacy statutes by other statutes, and federal preemption of state laws
remains a concern of many consumer advocates." '
c. Federal Preemption of State Protections
Calls for federal legislation mandating adequate security measures for
sensitive data are tempered by concerns that such legislation may water
down existing state protections. 12 Acts of Congress can preempt state
legislation and judicial precedents under both express and implied
preemption principles. 113 Express preemption requires a determination of
whether a state statute or requirement falls within the scope of a stated
preemption provision.14 Implied preemption, requiring a determination of
congressional intent, can occur under two circumstances. 115 The first
involves instances where a regulatory scheme is so pervasive that it is
reasonable to conclude the Congress intended to occupy an entire field. 116
This type of preemption, seen in areas like management-labor relations, 117
medical devices, 118 and oil tankers,'1 9 requires a "clear and manifest
purpose" that Congress intended to occupy the field. 120
111. In Bank of Am., N.A. v. City of Daly City, Cal., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1126 (N.D.
Cal. 2003), vacated, Bank of Am. v. Alameda County, 2004 U.S. App Lexis 14582 (9th Cir.
2004), the court held that the GLBA's saving clause did not prevent provisions of a local
consumer privacy notice prohibiting financial institutions from sharing information to their
affiliates from being preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The case was later vacated
on appeal, presumably because the local ordinance in question was repealed. See Anne P.
Fortney, Uniform National Standards for a Nationwide Industry: FCRA Preemption of State
Laws Under the Fact Act, 58 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 259 (2004).
112. See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., supra note 105 (warning that the Center would
oppose any legislation that weakened existing state laws); see also Brian Krebs, States Keep
Watchful Eye on Personal-Data Firms, washingtonpost.com, June 1, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/01/AR2005060 1 00359-pf.
html (quoting Montana Attorney General, Mike McGrath, who said that states would fight
vigorously to oppose federal legislation that would supersede state laws).
113. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000) (holding that a
state tort claim was preempted, not by the express preemption provision of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, but by its conflict with standards promulgated under
the Act); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983) ("Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a
specific area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.").
114. See generally CSX Transp., Inc. v. Eastwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) ("If the
statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the
first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best
evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent.").
115. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
116. See, e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989) (citing Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 212-13, as support).
117. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (finding that state courts
may not grant injunctions against activities prohibited by the National Labor Relations
Board).
118. See Buckman, Co. v. Plaintiff's Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352-53 (2001) (finding
that state fraud-on-the-FDA claims were preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act). But see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (allowing state
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The second circumstance occurs when there is an actual conflict between
the federal and state legislation, either because the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress, 121 or because compliance with both state and
federal laws is impossible. 122 "Obstacle preemption," as this latter type has
become known, has been criticized as a default doctrine in situations where
Congress's intent to preempt cannot be determined, or where there is not a
significant need for national uniformity in the particular field.' 23 There is
often said to be a presumption against preemption, 124 although it is unclear
whether this applies generally, or operates only in fields traditionally
occupied by the states, like health and safety.' 25
Recent decisions suggest that federal preemption remains a possibility,
even with a savings clause similar to the one seen in the GLBA. In Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., the Court noted that neither an express
preemption clause, nor a savings clause, "bar[s] the ordinary working of
conflict preemption principles."' 126 In other words, courts will still consider
whether a preemption clause supersedes a statute, and if it does not, courts
must consider whether ordinary ("implied") preemption principles apply. 127
If so, courts must then perform implied preemption analysis and determine
whether a statute conflicts with federal legislation under actual or obstacle
common law negligence claims against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective
pacemaker).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 91 (2000) (finding that the case was
governed by field preemption because "Congress ha[d] left no room for state regulation of
these matters"); Ray v. At. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
120. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing field preemption
as one of the ways in which Congress evinces a clear and manifest purpose to supersede the
historic police powers of the states).
121. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (ruling that state law which required
aliens to register and carry an alien identification card was preempted by federal registration
requirements).
122. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)
("The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation
must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal
superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives.").
123. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53
S.C. L. Rev. 967 (2002).
124. See Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230 ("We start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
125. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) ("[A]n assumption of
nonpre-emption is not triggered when the state regulates in an area where there has been a
significant federal presence.").
126. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 861, 869 (2000) (ruling that the a
standard promulgated by the Department of Transportation (DOT) under the authority of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempted a negligence suit against the
respondent car company for the failure to include a driver side air bag).
127. See id. at 867.
2006]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
preemption. 128 This same three-step analysis also applies to state tort
lawsuits. 129
In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, involving a common-law tort suit
against a boat manufacturer for failure to install propeller guards after the
Coast Guard had specifically decided not to require such devices under the
Federal Safety Boat Act (FSBA), the Court performed a similar analysis as
in Geier. 130 It first focused on the wording of the preemption clause of the
FSBA to determine congressional intent, concluding that the wording, along
with the presence of a savings clause, permitted a narrow reading of the
provision that excluded common law actions.131 It then performed an
implied preemption analysis, finding no intent by Congress to occupy the
field of boating safety, and no conflict between state common law suits and
the "accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."1 32
The Court declined to find that a decision to forego regulation in a
particular area, like the one made by the Coast Guard here, had "as much
preemptive force as a decision to regulate," though noting that it had the
ability to make such a conclusion. 133 Of particular importance seemed to
be the position taken by the Coast Guard, the federal agency in question. 134
Federal preemption doctrine, especially preemption of state tort claims,
remains unsettled. 135  Any federal legislation involving data security
measures will certainly impact state laws and regulations, and possibly state
common law actions for damages. As will be seen in Part II.C.3, proposed
federal bills deal with the issue of state law preemption in different ways. 136
128. See id. The Court found that the preemption clause and savings clause excluded
common-law actions, but held that the suit presented an obstacle to the DOT's objectives of
promoting safety by allowing a mix of passive restraint devices. Id. at 868, 881.
129. See id. at 867 (describing how a majority of the Court in Medtronic, consisting of the
plurality opinion and two concurrences, found that state common-law claims could be
treated similarly to legislative "enactments").
130. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-64 (2002).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 66 (internal quotations omitted).
133. Id. at 66 (emphasis omitted) (citing Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 384 (1983)).
134. See id. at 67-68. The Coast Guard had not imposed propeller guard requirements, in
contrast to the DOT's affirmative decision in Geier to promote alternative protection
systems, and it did not believe, as the DOT did, that a tort suit would stand as an obstacle to
the execution of the objectives of the legislation in question. Moreover, it did not exhibit a
concern that common-law suits would impede uniformity of manufacturing regulations
across the industry.
135. See Preemption of State Common Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 376, 383-86 (2005)
(noting a shift towards a presumption against a broad preemptive scope, particularly
involving traditional common-law claims, as seen in Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544
U.S. 431 (2005)).
136. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of proposed legislation.
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3. Effectiveness of Current Regulations
The effectiveness of federal and state government regulations at
improving corporate information security is unknown. While some
indications point to stronger security procedures as more businesses seek to
comply with regulations, other indications suggest that compliance
percentages are still low. 137 The latter also suggests that some signs of
improvement may be mere window dressing. 138
Possible reasons for noncompliance with regulations may be that the
patchwork of state and federal regulations is too confusing and difficult to
comply with, that there are just too many regulations, or that businesses do
not fear serious consequences for noncompliance, because the regulations
are too vague, or governmental agencies are not devoting enough resources
to enforcing them. 139 Fears of litigation could actually play a stronger role
in motivating businesses to dedicate more resources to information security
than compliance with governmental regulations, which suggests that
imposing liability on businesses may also help improve overall information
security. 140
Whatever the reason for possible noncompliance, many authorities
believe that more needs to be done, and advocate either streamlining current
legislative requirements, or increasing the protections afforded to third
137. Compare Ernst & Young, Global Information Security Survey 2005: Report on the
Widening Gap (2005), available at
http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/International/Global-Information-Security-Survey
_2005/$file/EY GlobalInformationSecurity survey_2005.pdf (reporting results from a
survey of over 1,300 organizations which showed that compliance with regulations is the
primary driver of information security), with Berinato, supra note 50 (reporting results from
the "2004 Global Information Security Survey" which found that negative factors, such as
the fear of litigation, remained primary drivers of security spending). Thirty-nine percent of
organizations in the "2004 Global Information Security Survey" reported that government
efforts to improve information security did not influence their security practices. See
Compliance? What's That?, CSO Magazine, Oct. 2005, at 28, available at
http://www.csoonline.comlread/100105/survey-compliance.html (also reporting on results
from the "2004 Global Information Security Survey"). According to the survey, 15% of
respondents who needed to be in compliance with SB 1386 were not; 17% of respondents
who needed to be in compliance with GLBA were not; 38% of respondents who needed to
be in compliance with HIPAA were not; and 38% of respondents who needed to be in
compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley were not. Id.
138. See Berinato, supra note 50 (noting that although security governance has improved
as more businesses created a Chief Security Office (CSO) or Chief Information Security
Officer (CISO) position (from 15% in 2003 to 31% in 2004), and implemented centralized
security management systems (from 11% in 2003 to 39% in 2004), many information
executives report their positions as lacking budget, staff, or authority); see also Ernst &
Young, supra note 137 (noting that nearly 90% of respondents who are implementing
security measures to comply with internal control regulations focus on creating and updating
policies and procedures, while only 41% report that they are taking this opportunity to
reorganize their information security function or change their security architecture).
139. See Compliance? What's That?, supra note 137.
140. See Berinato, supra note 137 and accompanying text; Compliance? What's That?,
supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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parties under current legislation. 141 Part II of this Note looks at federal and
state approaches to improving information security, through both legislative
means and the court system.
II. APPROACHES TO IMPROVE INFORMATION SECURITY
The causes of noncompliance to date are not clear, nor is the course of
action that will help alleviate security breaches. This section considers
further regulatory proposals for protecting third parties from lax
information security practices at both the federal and state level, focusing
on security regulations and breach notification laws. This part also
considers a possible common law framework of liability for security
breaches and discusses current obstacles to such a framework. While
stronger regulations and common law liability are not mutually exclusive
options and can serve to complement one another, there are opposing views
on whether civil liability should be imposed for companies whose lax
information security results in data breaches. 14 2
The enactment of statutes and regulations, such as the GLBA, the FTC's
Safeguards Rules, and California's Breach Notification Act, along with
enforcement actions against businesses and disclosures of security breaches
have been integral in raising awareness about the need for better
information security. 143 Part II.A considers existing federal responses to
enhancing security measures, while Part II.B looks at state statutory and
common law approaches targeting data security. Finally, Part II.C
describes proposed federal legislation for a uniform breach notification law.
A. Federal Action to Enhance Security Measures
Many privacy advocates, commentators, and industry groups agree that
Congress should extend the obligations imposed under the FTC's
Safeguards Rule to entities that store electronic data. 144 Although the
141. See discussion infra Part II.
142. See Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, supra note 36, at 35 (noting that
committee participants differed on whether the best way to promote critical infrastructure
protection was to target hackers and other perpetrators or vendors and service providers, for
negligent security policies and procedures).
143. See Financial Data Protection Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 3997 Before the House
Comm. on Financial Services, Subcomm. on Financial Institutions & Consumer Credit,
109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Evan Hendricks, Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/l10905eh.pdf [hereinafter H.R.
3997 Hearing].
144. See Identity Theft Hearing, supra note 70, at 10 (advocating for the extension of the
FTC's Safeguards Rule to organizations that are not financial institutions); Ctr. for
Democracy & Tech., supra note 105 (similar); see also Oversight Hearing on Data Security,
Data Breach Notices, Privacy and Identity Theft: Hearing Before the US. Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (calling for
extending the "modest" protections to third-party processors, such as Cardsystems, and data
brokers, such as Choicepoint), available at http://banking.senate.gov/ files/ACFDC9B.pdf
[hereinafter Data Security Hearing]; Examining the Financial Services Industry's
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Rule's flexibility is often praised, some believe that the regulations do not
go far enough and should be strengthened with more definitive standards
for information security. 145 Moreover, the FTC has been criticized for
failing to enforce these rules and to aggressively pursue privacy
protections. 46
Inadequate enforcement of privacy and security protections has
frequently been cited in calls for more rights that provide meaningful
sanctions and redress. Advocates and commentators who recognize the
importance of state-based approaches to privacy protection enforcement
caution the federal legislature not to preempt the functions provided by state
and local authorities. 147 More specific recommendations for effective
enforcement of security regulations include providing an express right of
action, setting minimum liquidated damages provisions for companies that
suffer security breaches due to negligence, and authorizing state attorneys
general to fine companies and establish funds for victims. 148
Recent bills considered in the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S.
Senate during 2005 have varied with respect to the issue of improving data
security, with some seeking to extend current regulations, 149 and others
seeming to undermine the protections. 150 None of these bills provide a
Responsibility and Role in Preventing Identity Theft and Protecting Sensitive Financial
Information: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
Securities Industry Association), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/ files/hammerman.pdf [hereinafter Financial Services Hearing].
145. See, e.g., Identity Theft Hearing, supra note 70, at 16-17 (statement of William H.
Sorrell, Attorney General of the State of Vermont and President of the National Association
of Attorneys General) (commenting that although the flexibility of the Safeguards Rule was
initially appropriate, in light of recent security breaches, more definitive standards are
needed); Editorial, Congress Must Deal with ID Theft, Wired, June 20, 2006,
http://wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1 848,67845,00.html (calling for stricter federal regulations,
such as mandatory encryption of all sensitive data, development of simple rules specific to
each industry, and funds for the FTC to enforce them).
146. See Protecting Consumer's Data: Policy Issues Raised by Choicepoint: Hearing
Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer, Protection, Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 82 (2005) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, President,
EPIC) (criticizing the FTC's failure to investigate Choicepoint's practices until it was too
late).
147. See id.; Identity Theft Hearing, supra note 70, at 17 (statement of William H. Sorrell,
noting the role of state attorneys general in investigations of security breaches).
148. See Daniel J. Solove & Chris J. Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection,
2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 357, 382.
149. See S. 1408, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (requiring any business entity or nonprofit
organization that acquires, maintains, or utilizes sensitive personal information to take
similar precautions mandated under the GLBA); S. 1332, 109th Cong. § 402 (2005)
(requiring more specific measures similar to the FTC's Safeguards Rule, including the
implementation of a comprehensive security program based on a risk assessment and
ongoing risk management controls).
150. See H.R. 3997 Hearing, supra note 143 (statement of Evan Hendricks,
Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times) (commenting on H.R. 3997, which mandates only
"reasonable policies and procedures" and does not require a risk assessment or
comprehensive security program).
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private cause of action-enforcement is left either to the FTC, State
Attorneys General, or the United States Attorney General.151
B. State Approaches to Enhancing Security Measures
At least two states, Arkansas and Nevada, have enacted legislation
mandating reasonable security measures. 152 Neither bill offers substantial
protection; both require entities that collect personal information to
implement "reasonable" security procedures to protect against unauthorized
access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure of information. 153
Even if states enact stronger legislation requiring businesses to protect
their sensitive data, some proponents argue that businesses will not take
adequate steps to secure sensitive data unless confronted with the threat of
civil liability. 154 The next section considers liability for damages resulting
from inadequate data security measures and obstacles to recovery.
1. Tort Liability
Some privacy advocates and security professionals believe that
government regulations are not enough. Instead, they argue that applying
common law rules to redress problems of negligent information security
will motivate businesses to enact better policies and procedures and comply
with industry standards in a more effective manner than a one-size-fits-all
government regulation could. 155  Injured parties, whether individuals
harmed by identity theft or corporations harmed by service providers,
would have an avenue of redress. Tort liability could also help crystallize
security standards, since many businesses seeking to minimize their liability
would comply with industry-wide standards as a demonstration of due
care. 15
6
Cases involving damages from security breaches have been brought in
court under various causes of action, such as negligence, breach of contract,
151. See S. 1408 § 5 (allowing recovery of penalties by the FTC and other administrative
agencies empowered under the GLBA, as well as states' attorneys general); S. 1332 § 403
(allowing federal and states' attorneys general to seek civil remedies and injunctive actions
for violations of the security safeguards).
152. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-110-104 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); Nev. Rev. Stat. §
603A.210 (2005).
153. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-110-104; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.210.
154. See, e.g., Bruggeman, supra note 27, at 129 (arguing that imposing liability on
software providers, data aggregators, and companies providing critical infrastructures would
greatly increase the cost of not ensuring adequate security); Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection, supra note 36, at 40, 43 (noting that some commentators believe
that a few critical infrastructure protection liability suits could change the cost-benefit
analysis of securing critical infrastructures); Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 148, at 385-86
(citing comments by Jim Harper of the Cato Institute).
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156. See Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, supra note 36, at 50 (stating that
compliance with industry-wide standards is usually an acceptable demonstration of due
care).
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and breach of fiduciary duty. 157 Courts have been reluctant, however, to
allow recovery in many of these actions. 158 While breach of contract
actions remain the best basis on which to bring a claim, this doctrine is
limited to instances where the plaintiff is in privity with the defendant. 159
Due to the free-flowing nature of data and the growth of information
brokers, like Choicepoint, injured parties frequently lack contractual
relationships with the party responsible for protecting their personal
information. 160
For these reasons, many advocates suggest that tort law may be the best
way to protect personal data. 16 1 Obstacles to imposing liability for security
breaches still remain, however, including the initial determination as to
whether such a duty exists, defining the standard of care, intervening acts of
third parties breaking the chain of causation, and the economic loss
doctrine. These hurdles are not insurmountable and may diminish as
greater awareness of the need for information security measures
increases. 162
To succeed on a claim of simple negligence, a plaintiff generally needs to
show that (1) the defendant had a duty to use reasonable care, (2) the
defendant failed to conform to the required standard and breached that duty
of care, (3) a reasonably close causal relationship exists between the
conduct and the resulting injury, and (4) as a result of that breach the
plaintiff suffered an injury. 163
a. Duty of Care
The first element of a negligence cause of action-that the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff-is governed by the general doctrine
that there is no affirmative duty to act, barring a special relationship
between the defendant and plaintiff. 164 Factors used in the determination of
whether a special relationship exists include the social interests involved,
157. See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, 427 F. Supp. 2d 526 (M.D. Penn.
2006) (dismissing breach of contract, negligence, and equitable subrogation claims against a
retail merchant resulting from a security breach); Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275
(S.C. 2003) (finding no duty of care owed by a bank that issued credit cards in the plaintiff's
name to an imposter because the plaintiff was not its customer).
158. See infra Part II.B.l.c.
159. See Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, supra note 36, at 44.
160. See generally, John Leland & Tom Zeller Jr., Technology and Easy Credit Give
Identity Thieves an Edge, N.Y. Times, May 30, 2006, at Al (noting that banks, credit card
companies, and retailers desire the instantaneous flow of information and credit).
161. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
162. See Shaw, supra note 35, at 4 (citing a 1990 California ATM safety law, Cal. Fin.
Code §§ 1300-1370, as an example of how courts and legislatures frequently make
businesses liable to customers for failure to protect against harm by third parties).
163. See Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Torts Cases and Materials 152 (Victor E.
Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly, & David F. Partlett, eds., 10th ed. 2001).
164. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965).
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the severity of the risk, the burden on the defendant, the likelihood of the
occurrence of the risk, and the relationship between the parties. 165
Though few courts have found a defendant liable for negligent
maintenance of information systems because of limitations discussed
below, there is growing recognition of a legal duty to protect sensitive
information. 166 In at least one case, Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., a court
found that a private investigator or information broker had a "duty to
exercise reasonable care" to not reveal a third party's personal information
if the disclosure creates a foreseeable risk of harm to the person whose
information is disclosed.167
b. Defining the Standard of Care
A number of commentators believe that a legal standard of care is
emerging due to a combination of federal and state regulatory and
enforcement actions, as well as court decisions that have imposed on
businesses the obligation to take adequate precautions to protect the
security of their information systems and the confidentiality of sensitive
data transmitted and stored on their systems. 168 Traditionally, if a duty of
care is found, the standard by which the defendant is judged is how a
reasonable person would act under similar circumstances. 169 This standard
of care may suffice in a negligence action, particularly where no security
precautions are taken. In a recent Michigan case, for example, a union
defendant who allowed an employee to take home confidential information
without any security measures, in spite of concerns expressed by the
executive board to the contrary, was found liable to union members who
were victims of identity theft that likely resulted from the theft of their
information while in the employee's possession. 170
165. See, e.g., Bell v. Michigan Council 25 of the Am. Fed'n of State, County, and Mun.
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1023, No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, at * 5 (Mich. Ct. App.
2005) (per curiam) (citing Murdock v. Higgins, 527 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (per
curiam)).
166. See generally Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (generally affirming
the lower court's finding that the Department of the Interior had breached its management
duties by not properly securing the computer system containing information on billions of
dollars in Indian trust accounts); Remsberg v. DocuSearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1008 (N.H.
2003) (holding that the "risk of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an
investigator has a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third person's personal
information to a client").
167. Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1001 (finding that an investigation service that discovered
the decedent's work address through a pretextual phone call, and then sold it to another
person, was liable for damages to the person deceived, under the N.H. Consumer Protection
Act).
168. See Smedinghoff, supra note 13, at 13 (noting the emergence of a definition of
"reasonable security"); Jane Strachan, Cybersecurity Obligations, 20 Me. B.J. 90, 90-91
(2005) (discussing recent court decisions and FTC rules and actions that are indicative of an
emerging duty of care in information security).
169. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1965).
170. See Bell, 2005 WL 356306, at *5.
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In cases where security precautions have been taken, however, and the
issue is one of degree, this standard of care may be difficult to determine.
Rather than apply the reasonable person standard of care, courts can adopt a
standard of conduct provided by a statute, regulation, or industry practice
under the principle of negligence per se. 17 1 A general standard of care for
negligence actions can be derived from the process-oriented approach seen
in the FTC's Safeguards Rule, originally applied to financial institutions
subject to the FTC's jurisdiction, and recently expanded, in practice, if not
officially, to cover other businesses. 172 Though not mandating the specific
technical measures organizations need to take to meet governmental
expectations, this process-oriented approach requires organizations to
identify risks, assess the impact of those risks, develop and implement
safeguards to mitigate those risks, and periodically test and monitor the
effectiveness of security procedures, updating them as necessary.173
Questions still remain, however, as to the standard of care that businesses
in different industries should meet in their information security practices.
The FTC enforcement actions discussed in Part I serve to position the
Safeguards Rule as a general standard. Recent statements by the FTC
suggest a move to establish a de facto standard for all entities that collect,
maintain and transfer, or sell sensitive consumer information' 74 While it
may serve to set a minimum baseline standard, more specific industry
benchmarks may be needed to ensure adequate security protection.175
Industry standards already exist in many sectors, including financial
services and retail. 176 In addition to the regulations promulgated by the
governmental agencies mandated under the GLBA, further security
guidance documents, security industry resources, and standard-setting
organizations provide direction for the development of industry
171. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A cmt. e. Under the doctrine of negligence per
se, the common-law tort of negligence is not changed, but the standard of care applied is
changed from a general standard to a specific rule of conduct.
172. See supra Part I.B. 1 .b.
173. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
174. See Identity Theft Hearing, supra note 70, at 10 (statement of Deborah Platt Majoras,
Chairman, FTC) (recommending that the Congress authorize the Commission to extend the
Safeguards Rule beyond customer information collected by financial institutions, although
acknowledging that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act already requires
companies to secure sensitive data if substantial consumer injury could result from the
failure to do so).
175. See generally Freeman, supra note 21, at 9-11 (providing examples of general
security standards, such as the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the International
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), and ISO 17799, a
protocol developed by the International Standards Organization).
176. See Kiefer, supra note 15, at 29-30 (describing non-regulatory sources of security
obligations arising from industry-wide rules, such as the National Automated Clearing
House Association's rules regarding online debit entries against a Web shopper's bank
account; the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, requiring merchants and
payment processors to safeguard account data and to protect networks against attack; and
Identrus, LLC, setting operating rules and policies for secure business-to-business electronic
commerce).
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expectations. 177 Taken as a whole, the regulations lay out the process by
which financial institutions should determine which security controls are
appropriate for their businesses to secure their computer systems and
customer data.
Industry groups, seeking to avoid more burdensome governmental
regulation, are working to develop industry-wide standards. 178  But
compliance with industry standards is not necessarily sufficient to meet the
standard of care in a negligence action. 179 Under traditional negligence
theory, a defendant is considered negligent if the burden of taking adequate
precautions against a foreseeable risk is less than the probability of damage
and the gravity of the damage. 180 If corporations take steps to fulfill
compliance requirements, without making a real commitment to
information security, they may be exposing themselves to liability.
c. Causation and Harm
Plaintiffs encounter difficulties to recovery under a negligence theory
when trying to prove the elements of causation and harm. Causation-that
a breach was the proximate cause of the harm to the plaintiff--can be
difficult to prove in the case of identity theft where criminals are
infrequently caught. 181 Even if the plaintiff can show harm, the defendant's
negligence may not be the proximate cause in many of these instances.
Intervening criminal acts may break the chain of causation so that the
177. See generally Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, supra note 17. In the financial
sector, governmental agencies, such as the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC), direct businesses and organizations to supplement regulations with agency
guidelines, third party information security resources, and standard setting groups. The
FFIEC is an interagency body empowered by the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of
Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union Administration to make recommendations
to promote uniformity in the supervision of financial institutions. See FFIEC,
http://www.ffiec.gov (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
178. See Matt Hines, Cybersecurity Vendors Form Policy Advocacy Group, CNet
News.com, Feb. 25, 2004, http://news.com.com/Cybersecurity+vendors+form+policy+
advocacy+group/2100-7355_3-5165204.html (reporting on the formation of the Cyber
Security Industry Alliance whose goal is to develop security policies and initiatives among
government and businesses).
179. See The T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding
that the owner of tugboats was liable to the owners of barges towed by the tugboats and sunk
in a storm because he was negligent in not having weather radios on the tugs, even though
such radios were not the industry norm).
180. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
(expressing the actor's duty in algebraic terms, where liability depends on whether B (the
burden of adequate precautions) is less than P (the probability of a certain event occurring)
multiplied by L (the gravity of the injury if the event occurs)).
181. Police departments are not equipped to deal with this type of theft and are reluctant
to pursue investigations. Identity Theft Res. Ctr., Identity Theft: The Aftermath 2003, 34
(2003), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/idaftermath.pdf (reporting results of a
survey that found that only 51% of respondents-the victims of identity theft-had the
police take a report during their first contact with the authorities).
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defendant's breach of duty is not the legal cause of the injury suffered by
the plaintiff. 182
Additionally, many jurisdictions do not allow plaintiffs to recover for
economic losses absent any physical injury, under the economic loss
doctrine. 183 The rationale for this rule is to restrict economic loss claims to
breach of warranty or breach of contract claims, and limit liability to those
injuries that are foreseeable. 184 The economic loss doctrine has been
applied in varying forms, however, and some courts have shown an
indication of moving away from this limitation altogether.' 85
A recent decision, Stollenwerk v. Tri- West Healthcare Alliance, granting
a defendant's motion for summary judgment, highlights some of the
difficulties plaintiffs can expect to encounter. 186  The defendant, a
government contractor managing the Department of Defense's regional
health insurance program, experienced a burglary, but took no subsequent
action to secure its facility. 187 A year and a half later, thieves broke in
again and stole computer hard drives containing the plaintiffs' personal
information. 188 Soon afterwards, the personal information of one plaintiff
was used in six attempts to open credit card accounts, two of which were
successful. 189 The Arizona Federal District Court held that the plaintiff
could not show that the defendant's security measures produced the
plaintiffs injury, "'in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause." ' 190  The closeness in time between the
burglary and the first attempt at identity theft, though persuasive, was not
found to be "dispositive of the causation issue."' 191 Two other plaintiffs,
neither the victim of identity theft, sought to recoup the costs of credit
182. See Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, supra note 36, at 50.
183. See, e.g., Spivack v. Berks Ridge Corp., Inc, 586 A.2d 402 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(holding that condominium purchasers could not sue real estate developers and builders for
alleged defects). In product liability cases, the doctrine is usually applied where damages
occur only to the product itself. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Co.,
No. 1:05-CV-0461, 2005 WL 2665326, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2005) (finding that the
economic loss doctrine barred a negligence claim for loss of electronic data due to computer
malfunction since the data was considered to be part of the property itself).
184. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 2005 WL 2665326, at *2-3.
185. See, e.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So.2d 532 (Fla.
2004) (applying the economic loss doctrine only in product liability cases or where a party in
contractual privity with another seeks to recover tort damages for matters arising from the
contract); Neb. Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 128
(Iowa 1984) (applying the doctrine to all tort claims that fail to show personal injury or
property damage); People Exp. Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 118 (N.J.
1985) (holding that economic losses are recoverable if suffered by individuals the defendant
knows or has reason to know will likely suffer losses).
186. See Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. 03-0185, 2005 WL 2465906
(D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005).
187. See id. at*1.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *5 (quoting Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Ariz.
1990)).
191. See id. at *7.
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monitoring and identity theft insurance, basing their arguments on a theory
analogous to medical monitoring for toxic exposure. 192 While the court
seemed willing to consider the analogy, it found that the plaintiffs could not
prove actual exposure of sensitive personal information. 193
Stollenwerk indicates just a few of the obstacles to recovering damages
under tort law for an information security breach. Traditional notions of
harm and causation will need to be reconsidered in an information security
context before a negligence cause of action can provide an adequate remedy
to those injured by inadequate security policies and procedures.
2. State Privacy and Breach Notification Laws
States have led the way in enacting breach notification laws and
consumer identity theft protection. 194 The purpose of breach notification
laws is twofold: to inform consumers when unauthorized individuals have
accessed their personal information so they can take precautions to prevent
or minimize harm, and to encourage businesses to improve data security to
prevent breaches that will trigger consumer notification. 195 Currently, over
twenty states have enacted breach notification laws, with varying
requirements. 196 Some statutes target only information brokers, 197 while
others include any persons doing business in the state. 198 Some statutes
provide an express private right of action,199 while most provide for state
enforcement actions. 200 The difficulty in complying with these various
requirements has led many commentators and business industry groups to
call for a uniform federal notification law.201
192. See id. at *3.
193. See id. at *5.
194. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
195. See Data Security Hearing, supra note 144 (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski,
Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
196. See supra note 104.
197. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-911(2) (Supp. 2005) (defining information broker as
any person or entity who collects, assembles, evaluates, compiles, reports, transmits,
transfers, or communicates data for fees or dues); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1347(3)
(Supp. 2005) (defining information broker similarly except that the entity's primary purpose
is furnishing personal data to nonaffiliated third parties).
198. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 12B-102 (Supp. 2005) (covering any individual or
commercial entity that "conducts business in Delaware and that owns or licenses
computerized data that includes personal information about a resident of Delaware").
199. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-2104 (2001) (allowing courts to award three
times the actual damages).
200. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-07 (Supp. 2005) (making a violation of the
breach notification law a violation of North Dakota's antifraud statute, and giving
enforcement powers to the attorney general).
201. See, e.g., Financial Services Hearing, supra note 144 (statement of Ira D.
Hammerman, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Securities Industry Association)
(calling for a targeted federal regulatory response); Press Release, Information Technology
Association of America (ITAA), ITAA Calls for Improvements to Data Breach Notification
Bill (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.itaa.org/infosec/release.cfm?ID=1973 (calling
for a single national standard but critical of Senate bill, S. 751).
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The starting point for much of the discussion in this area is California's
Breach Notification Law, SB 1386.202 A number of privacy advocates
recommend SB 1386 as the model for future federal legislation,20 3 although
many industry groups argue that the impact of similar legislation could
result in unintended and unwanted effects.204
Notification is required when someone has compromised the security,
confidentiality, or integrity of state residents' personal information. Most
statutes follow SB 1386's definition of personal information as an
individual's first name or first initial, last name, and at least a social
security number, driver's license number or state identification card
number, or an account number, credit card number, or debit card number in
combination with any security code necessary to access a financial
account. 20 5 Some state statutes are more expansive and include additional
data elements, such as medical information, 206 date of birth, or mother's
maiden name.207
SB 1386 requires notification when unencrypted personal information
"was, or has reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized
person," 20 8 and over ten states have followed suit.20 9 As an alternative,
some states require notification when a business or organization determines
there is a likely or reasonable risk of harm to consumers. 210 This "harm
202. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
203. See Solove & Hooflnagle, supra note 148, at 374; see generally State Pub. Interest
Groups and Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., The Clean Credit and Identity Theft
Protection Act: Model State Laws (2005), available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/model.pdf (describing a model act which provides
template provisions for state legislatures that are designed to help consumers prevent some
of the harm from identity theft). The breach notification is similar to California's SB 1386
law and requires notice to state residents when any entity that handles, collects, or
disseminates personal information when there has been a security breach, as well as allow a
civil action by any individual injured by a violation of the statute. See State Pub. Interest
Groups and Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., supra, § 7(B)(1), (D)(1).
204. See Financial Services Hearing, supra note 144 (statement of Ira D. Hammerman,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Securities Industry Association) (warning that
consumers could become desensitized to breach notifications and fail to act on the
information).
205. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29 (West Supp. 2006).
206. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 4-110-103 (Supp. 2005).
207. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-01 (Supp. 2005). But cf N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
75-65 (2005) (excluding e-mails and parents' surnames in the definition).
208. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29(a).
209. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 12B-102 (2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §
1347 (Supp. 2005); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. § 899-aa (McKinney Supp. 2006); see also
Consumers Union, Notice of Security Breach State Laws (2006),
http://www.consumersunion.org/campaigns/Breachlaws-May05.pdf (describing the various
requirements of different state notification laws, including whether a state has a "harm
trigger").
210. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 4-110-105 ("Notification under this section is not
required if, after a reasonable investigation, the person or business determines that there is no
reasonable likelihood of harm to customers."); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a-701(b) (West
Supp. 2006) (requiring no notification in the event of a breach, but only after consultation
with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies).
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trigger" is viewed by many consumer advocates as giving too much
discretion to businesses. 211 Additionally, advocates argue that "harm" is
often construed narrowly and does not take into account the inconveniences
that consumers experience after a security breach.212 Proponents of this
approach warn that without the "harm trigger," consumers will be deluged
with breach notices that bear no relation to the risk of actual harm, and may
become confused or desensitized to future notices.2 13
Additional issues remain over the question of exemptions to notice. For
example, while SB 1386 and most, if not all, state statutes provide a notice
exemption for data that is encrypted, they do not specify the level of
encryption necessary to exempt the organization. 214  Some privacy
advocates argue that, because of weaknesses in encryption technologies,
breach notification laws should not exempt encrypted data from breach
notification.215  Others, however, argue that removing the exemption
requirement would increase notices of questionable value sent to consumers
and also reduce the incentive for businesses to improve security through
data encryption.216
A number of states exempt financial institutions, subject to the GLBA
notification requirements, and health organizations, subject to violations of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
from the notification requirements. 217  Some statutes provide that
compliance is not necessary where an entity is covered by an existing
211. See Data Security Hearing, supra note 144 (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski,
Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (warning that requiring a
"harm trigger" may mean that consumers will not be notified after a breach if a business
does not know who took the data or why, and citing the example of CitiFinancial, which
claimed that the loss of unencrypted backup tapes containing millions of names and Social
Security numbers posed little risk of harm to consumers).
212. See, e.g., H.R. 3997 Hearing, supra note 143 (statement of Evan Hendricks,
Editor/Publisher, Privacy Times) (arguing against a particular House bill that did not include
inconvenience of changing or closing a financial account into its definition of "harm").
213. See, e.g., Financial Services Hearing, supra note 144 (statement of Ira D.
Hammerman, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Securities Industry Association).
214. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29 (West Supp. 2006); N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-01
(Supp. 2005) (defining "personal information" as data elements that are not encrypted); N.C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 75-65 (2005); see also Skinner, supra note 102, at 45 (noting that the
authors of SB 1386 appeared to equate encryption with security, rather than recognizing that
encryption is just one component of a security program).
215. See Data Security Hearing, supra note 144 (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski,
Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
216. See, e.g., Press Release, ITAA, supra note 201. A recent survey found that security
breach notification regulations were influential in deciding to use data encryption, suggesting
this assertion might be true. Larry Ponemon, Encryption: A Nice Idea Few Want to
Implement, TechWorld, Dec. 30, 2005,
http://www.techworld.com/security/features/index.cfi?featureid=2116.
217. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:3071-3077 (Supp. 2006) (exempting financial
institutions in compliance with federal guidelines); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 325E.61 (West Supp.
2005) (exempting financial institutions and HIPAA entities).
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federal or state law if that law provides greater protection to consumers and
disclosure requirements that are as thorough.218
Finally, only security breaches involving "computerized data" fall under
the notification requirements of SB 1386 and most other statutes; loss of
paper records, which still account for the majority of known identity thefts,
is covered by a minority of the state breach notification statutes. 219
C. Federal Breach Notification Bills
A number of breach bills have been introduced in Congress since 2005,
yet Congress has been unable to reach a consensus and is unlikely to enact a
bill in the near future. 220 Some version of a data security and breach
notification legislation will likely emerge, however, as both industry
representatives and consumer groups acknowledge the need for federal
legislation.221 Aspects of these bills, while similar in many respects, have
important differences in the scope of information protected, the trigger for
notification and the form it must take, exemptions from notification,
penalties, and preemption of state laws.222 These differences are described
below.
1. Scope of Protection
How legislation defines "personal information" will impact its
applicability in security breach notification. One of the more restrictive
bills defines "sensitive personal information" as an individual's address in
addition to the personal information required under SB 1386.223 Another
bill defines personal information more broadly as either an individual's first
and last name, address, or phone number.224 Yet another requires "any
combination of identifying information that would allow the unauthorized
218. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 4-110-106 (Supp. 2005) (excluding businesses that are
regulated by "a state or federal law that provides greater protection to personal information
and at least as thorough disclosure requirements"); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 12B-103(b)
(2005).
219. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 75-65 (2005) (covering personal information in any form,
"whether computerized, paper, or otherwise"); Skinner, supra note 102.
220. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Waking Up to Recurring ID Nightmares, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
2006, at C3 (noting the lack of agreement among industry groups, who want to retain
discretion over when to notify consumers of a breach, and consumer groups, who advocate
for a broader bill that would preserve existing state laws while implementing broad federal
notification requirements).
221. See, e.g., Tom Zeller, Jr., Data Security Laws Seem Likely, So Consumers and
Businesses Vie to Shape Them, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2005, at C3; Kevin Cronberg, Data
Breach Notification Legislation: A Short Review, Cyber Security Industry Alliance
Newsletter, Mar. 2006,
https://www.csialliance.org/news/newsletters/mar2006/mardatabreach.html (calling for
federal breach notification legislation).
222. See, e.g., S. 1408, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3997,
109th Cong. (2005); S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005).
223. See S. 1326, 109th Cong. § 2(4) (2005).
224. See H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. § 5(7) (2005).
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person to reasonably be able to identify the indiv'idual. '225 Of course, the
more restrictive the definition, the less likely the number of security
breaches will require notification.
2. Notification Trigger
The types of breaches that trigger notification differ among the bills.
Most require there to be significant or reasonable risk of identity theft to the
person whose information has been acquired,226 although some bills call for
notification when there has likely been unauthorized access to personal
information. 227 But even these latter bills provide safe harbors as long as a
risk assessment concludes that no significant risk of harm exists and the
entity notifies the appropriate government agency,228 where compliance
could compromise national security or hinder a law enforcement
investigation,229 or where the accessed data is encrypted.230
3. Preemption of State Laws
Though security and privacy advocates acknowledge the need for a
national standard governing breach notification, some fear that potential
federal legislation intended to preempt state laws will dilute the more
stringent provisions of these disclosure statutes. 231 Opponents of federal
regulation alone argue that federal regulation should provide a baseline of
security protections, while the states should be able to innovate new privacy
protection approaches. 232 While some bills propose only partial preemption
of state laws,233 others would completely preempt state or local laws
involving information security programs or security breach notification
rules.234 One bill would go so far as to preempt any "state or local law,
regulation, rule, administrative procedure, or judicial precedent" which
imposes liability on a business for failure to implement and maintain an
225. S. 768, 109th Cong. § 8(a) (2005).
226. See, e.g., S. 1326 § 3(b)(1); S. 1408 § 3(c); H.R. 3997 § 3(f).
227. See, e.g., S. 1789 § 321(a); S. 768 § 8(a).
228. See, e.g., S. 1789 § 322(b).
229. See, e.g., S. 1789 § 322(a).
230. See, e.g., H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. § 3(f) (2005); S. 768 § 8(a).
231. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
232. See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 148, at 377-78; see also Data Security Hearing,
supra note 144 (statement by Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S.
Public Interest Research Group) (asserting that "[a] strong argument can be made that the
states' privacy leadership is adequate and continuing"). But see Declan McCullagh,
Perspective: Navigating the Law of Unintended Consequences, CNet News.com, Mar. 14,
2005, http://news.com.com/Navigating+the+law+of+unintended+consequences/20 10-
7348_3-5611746.html (describing state laws whose consequences could prove problematic
either because they were written too narrowly or too broadly).
233. See S. 1789 § 304 (preempting any state laws related to protective security measures
for personal information).
234. See S. 1326, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005); S. 1408, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005); H.R. 3997 §
6(a).
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adequate information security program or notify an individual of any breach
of security, effectively precluding common law actions.235
Given the numerous breach notification laws in existence, federal
legislation preempting state statutes could undermine current consumer
protections. The following section proposes federal legislation which will
ensure that businesses take appropriate steps to protect sensitive data while
maintaining the protection afforded under state laws.
III. PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Security breaches will continue to occur until businesses find that the
costs from inadequate security measures outweigh the investments needed
to implement a comprehensive information security plan.236 Federal and
state governments, along with the courts, can shift this cost-benefit analysis
towards better security in the ways discussed below.
A. Maintain GLBA 's and FTC's Process-Oriented Approach
Approaching information security from a risk management perspective,
rather than mandating specific technical measures, will lead to more
effective information security measures. Any federal legislation should
maintain the flexible nature of the process-oriented approach seen in the
GLBA-mandated Interagency Guidelines and Safeguards Rule. But federal
agencies, such as the FTC, are limited in their resources, so future
legislation should not remove the enforcement role of the states from such a
regulatory scheme.
The FTC has been successful in pursuing investigations and enforcement
actions against companies that have experienced major security breaches. 237
Although the Commission has made recent moves to expand the Safeguards
Rule to nonfinancial institutions whose security practices have caused or
could likely cause substantial injury to consumers, Congress should
formally extend the FTC's authority to all entities that store electronic
data.238 In particular, this authority should extend to data brokers and third
party processors. Congress should also maintain the Safeguards Rule's
process-oriented approach and resist calls to mandate specific technical
measures. That responsibility is better left to regulatory agencies, which
can provide specific regulations based on the nature of the risks faced by
each industry.239
235. H.R. 3997 § 6(c) (expressly excluding state trespass, contract, tort, or fraud actions
from preemption).
236. See Part L.A supra for a discussion of those costs and reasons to improve
information security. See also Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, supra note 36,
at 43 (noting the need to change the cost-benefit analysis of securing critical infrastructures).
237. See supra Part I.B.l.a.
238. See supra Part I.B.l.b.
239. See generally supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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B. Allow Development of Common Law Liability
Common law negligence remedies can serve an important role in
providing recourse to injured victims, helping crystallize security standards,
and motivating businesses to take reasonable steps to protect their
information systems. As more courts acknowledge the responsibility of
businesses to "become increasingly vigilant in protecting such
information," 240 and redefine traditional notions of harm, causation, and
duties in an information security context, barriers to recovery under a
negligence theory for harm caused by lax security practices will fall.
1. Standard of Care
Standards of care must remain flexible to accommodate the range of
situations encountered. Applying process-oriented standards, like the
FTC's Safeguards Rule, to a defendant's conduct will force courts to
consider the rationale for a business's security plan, including reasons for
failing to enact certain measures. Overall compliance with industry
standards, if they exist, will also need to be considered when determining
an appropriate standard of care. A business decision not to follow such
standards in light of specific risk factors should be evaluated if those risks
materialize and cause harm to third parties.
2. A New Definition of Harm and Causation
To serve tort law's purposes of providing recourse to injured parties and
encouraging risk-mitigating behavior by businesses, courts will need to
consider harm and causation differently in an information security context.
A proper notion of harm will need to encompass monetary damages,
inconvenience, time, and monitoring and insurance costs to third parties. 241
But even if courts are willing to accept new definitions of harm, injured
parties will not recover unless the issues posed by security breaches and
identity theft are addressed.242 Many security breaches and instances of
identity theft are never solved,243 leaving injured parties unable to show
with absolute certainty that a particular security breach caused their
harm. 244
C. Encourage Disclosure in Information Security
Imposing greater liability on businesses for damage caused by inadequate
security procedures could exacerbate the problem of insufficient
240. Bell v. Mich. Council 25 of the Am. Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees,
AFL-CIO, Local 1023, No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005).
241. See supra Part II.B.l.c.
242. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
244. See Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. Civ. 03-0185, 2005 WL
2465906, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005).
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information disclosure. 245 A federal disclosure law is needed, not just to
inform consumers of potential risks and encourage companies to ensure
adequate protection, but also to provide information to businesses,
organizations, and government on the true scope of the problem for proper
risk assessment.
D. Federal Breach Notification Law
Congress should implement security breach legislation, which does not
weaken many of the protections already mandated under state laws. Such a
law should parallel the majority of state laws and, to avoid overwhelming
and (even worse) desensitizing consumers with breach notifications, should
require notification where there is a reasonable risk of harm. 246 The
determination of what constitutes harm should be made in consultation with
federal authorities, as Connecticut's statute requires, to ensure that
corporations provide adequate notification. 247
Exemptions from notification should include encrypted data to encourage
more companies to implement encryption methods. 248 Notification should
be required for both paper and electronic data breaches, since loss of paper
records still accounts for the majority of known identity thefts.2 49
Most importantly, federal legislation should contain a narrow preemption
provision and savings clause similar to the GLBA's provisions.250 Only
state statutes' provisions that are inconsistent with federal legislation should
be preempted to the extent of the inconsistency. A savings clause should
clearly exclude from preemption state statutes that afford greater protection
and any state common law causes of action for victims injured by security
breaches. 25'
Allowing states to serve as "laborator[ies] . . . and try novel social and
economic experiments" 252 to protect data security appears to conflict with
calls for a uniform federal standard. Most proposed legislation calls for
preemption of state statutes,253 and only one expressly saves common law
claims from preemption.254 While uniformity can lead to more certainty in
the courts and decrease costs to businesses, which are no longer liable under
state enactments and lawsuits, it shifts the costs of damages to consumers
who are not in a position to protect the data maintained by businesses and
245. See supra Part I.A.
246. See supra Part II.B.2, note 204 and accompanying text.
247. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a-701 (West Supp. 2006).
248. See Ponemon, supra note 216 and accompanying text. Concerns over the type of
encryption necessary to meet the exemption can be resolved by requiring federal agencies'
regulations to address the issue.
249. See Skinner, supra note 102.
250. See Part I.B.l.a supra for discussion of GLBA's provisions.
251. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
252. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
253. See, e.g., S. 1408, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005).
254. See H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. §6(c) (2005).
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organizations. 255 Requiring corporations to bear the cost of inadequate
information security will ensure that affirmative steps are taken to improve
security. 256
CONCLUSION
A strong federal breach notification legislation coupled with the
development of a common law tort liability framework for inadequately
protecting personal and sensitive consumer information will serve to
encourage protection of information systems and assets. Not only does it
place the responsibility for protecting this type of data on the entities in the
best position to take protective measures, but it will help ensure the growth
and reliance on electronic information systems.
255. See Joseph Nocera, Data Theft: How to Fix the Mess, N.Y. Times, July 9, 2005, at
CI (suggesting that the only way to manage the risks and effects of identity theft is by
making financial institutions liable for fraudulent transactions).
256. See id.
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